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Education
in Values: What, Why and For Whom. Esther
Joos Esteban. 1990. Sinag-tala.
Explains the rationale for values
education.
If you ask a group "What are values?" a
wide range of responses will likely ensue.
Many assert that values are"desirable
traits"; others maintain that they are
"customs and traditions", "socially
accepted standards" or "worthwhile goals";
and still others suggest that values
are"beliefs", "moral principles" or a
"code of ethics".
It is precisely this broad and sometimes
contradictory range of answers that is
disturbing. If educators are to make any
ground in teaching values, they themselves
must have a uniform understanding of what
they are aiming at.
Part I of this book examines the
fundamental difference between moral
values and cultural behavioral values.
Treatment is given to values needed for
individual maturity and social well-being.
Some chapters of this section attempt to
trace absolute values (respect for life,
etc.) to "the Divine Law-giver and the
Moral Law". However, the author refrains
from strictly theological (faith-based)
reasoning, appealing only to rational
arguments that most would find logical
even in a pluralistic culture (in her
seminars she has frequently had students
from various Western and Asian
cultures).
Part II examines why Values Education is a
natural right of the child, and claims
that it essentially aims at moral
education, preparation for life, and
schooling in "life and reality". An
overview of the learning process, the
interplay of the mind, the emotions, the
will, etc. is given; factors that
influence the child in this process are
dealt with as well − the family, the
school, the culture, etc.
The author teaches graduate courses at the
Institute for Development Education of the
University of Asia and the Pacific.
Real
Ethics: Rethinking the foundations of
morality. John Rist. 2002.
Cambridge University Press. 295 pp.
A discussion of the philosophical
foundations for objectivity in ethics.
The author tries to tackle a pressing
problem in moral philosophy: whether our
ethics is truly grounded in reality, and
therefore transcends individual preference
and cultural diversity, or whether it is
arbitrary. He shows rather well that a
view of human behavior is necessarily
linked to our view of man, and that is
necessarily linked to metaphysical and/or
religious outlook. In fact, modern
thinkers ( and he takes a very honest look
at a wide range of positions ) that seem
to reject tradition actually require these
philosophical foundations that they claim
to reject, without which their own theory
would be meaningless.
Praise
and Blame: Moral Realism and Its
Applications. Daniel N. Robinson.
2003. Princeton University Press.
225pp.
The author attempts in this book to
formulate a theory that would justify
value judgments.
In our pluralistic age, we note a
hesitation to use the words “right” and
“wrong”, or to call certain acts
“good” or “bad”, yet we cannot avoid
praising certain behavior or blaming
people for acts they should not have
committed. Reluctant to use clear terms
like “right” and “wrong,” a teacher
might tell a student that his or her
behavior is “unhelpful,” “unhealthy,”
or “inappropriate,” but beneath such
fuzziness the fact that the student was
censured remains, and the clearest reason
for not engaging in such activity is still
moral (the student just mentioned could
easily answer “So what? Why do I have to
be helpful, or healthy, or comply to your
standards of appropriateness?”).
Robinson looks at the reasons why modern
intellectuals find morality problematic.
He points out, for instance, that the fact
that sciences are values-free shouldn’t
inhibit us from making value judgments
where appropriate, since reality is plural
in form, and thus techniques of scientific
investigation might not apply to moral
analysis.
The book looks especially at determinism
− the view that our actions, psychology
and even identity as persons is merely the
result of our environment or upbringing,
and therefore we do not really choose
freely and cannot be considered morally
responsible. In a detailed series of
reflections, the author makes the claim
that we do indeed have sufficient control
to be truly considered moral agents.
Human
Nature and the Freedom of Public Religious
Expression. Stephen G. Post. 2002.
University of Notre Dame Press. 152
pp.
Arguments and evidence to the effect that
religion is a natural part of humanity,
and need not be shut out of public
life.
Many modern democracies are now very
pluralistic societies. To ensure every
citizen’s right to practice religion
freely, even if his or her religion only
represents a minority of the society,
governments are usually required by law
not to impose or even favor any particular
religion. Exactly how this
"non-establishment" principle works in
practice is sometimes a matter of
controversy. A strict separation policy
might reach extremes of cutting all public
funds for any religion-affiliated
educational or social welfare program,
even though many tax-paying citizens may
prefer such programs. If religious symbols
are visible in public areas, atheists may
feel uncomfortable, but if all such
references are forcibly removed
religionists may say the state is unfairly
imposing a lifestyle in which people
pretend God were irrelevant.
Stephen Post offers ample evidence,
especially from the neurosciences, to show
that religious activity is natural to
people, and that therefore it is
unreasonable to prohibit or marginalize
it, or take the attitude that it must be
confined to the private, individual realm.
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