ETHICS IN GENERAL 一般的な理論

The Nation's Morals. 「国民の道徳」

  • 西部邁。2000年。蒸桑社。
  • 日本の伝統道徳概観
  • An overview of Japan’s moral tradition

Real Ethics: Rethinking the foundations of morality 「真の倫理:道徳の基礎を再検討する」. John Rist著. 2002年. Cambridge University Press出版. 295 pp.(全295頁)

  • A discussion of the philosophical foundations for objectivity in ethics.
  • 倫理的客観性のための哲学的基礎の探究。


Human Nature and the Freedom of Public Religious Expression「人間本性と公的宗教表現の自由」. Stephen G. Post著. 2002年. University of Notre Dame Press出版. 152 pp.(全152頁)

  • Arguments and evidence to the effect that religion is a natural part of humanity, and need not be shut out of public life.
  • 宗教は人の本質的要素であり、社会活動から隔離すべきではない賛成論及びその裏付け。


Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications「道徳の現実と応用の賛否」. Daniel N. Robinson著. 2003年. Princeton University Press出版. 225pp.(全225頁)

  • The author attempts in this book to formulate a theory that would justify value judgments.
  • 著者は価値を尺度にする理論を正当化する試みを述べる。





Real Ethics: Rethinking the foundations of morality. John Rist. 2002. Cambridge University Press. 295 pp.

A discussion of the philosophical foundations for objectivity in ethics.

The author tries to tackle a pressing problem in moral philosophy: whether our ethics is truly grounded in reality, and therefore transcends individual preference and cultural diversity, or whether it is arbitrary. He shows rather well that a view of human behavior is necessarily linked to our view of man, and that is necessarily linked to metaphysical and/or religious outlook. In fact, modern thinkers (and he takes a very honest look at a wide range of positions) that seem to reject tradition actually require these philosophical foundations that they claim to reject, without which their own theory would be meaningless.


Human Nature and the Freedom of Public Religious Expression. Stephen G. Post. 2002. University of Notre Dame Press. 152 pp.

Arguments and evidence to the effect that religion is a natural part of humanity, and need not be shut out of public life.

Many modern democracies are now very pluralistic societies. To ensure every citizen‘s right to practice religion freely, even if his or her religion only represents a minority of the society, governments are usually required by law not to impose or even favor any particular religion. Exactly how this "non-establishment" principle works in practice is sometimes a matter of controversy. A strict separation policy might reach extremes of cutting all public funds for any religion-affiliated educational or social welfare program, even though many tax-paying citizens may prefer such programs. If religious symbols are visible in public areas, atheists may feel uncomfortable, but if all such references are forcibly removed religionists may say the state is unfairly imposing a lifestyle in which people pretend God were irrelevant.

Stephen Post offers ample evidence, especially from the neurosciences, to show that religious activity is natural to people, and that therefore it is unreasonable to prohibit or marginalize it, or take the attitude that it must be confined to the private, individual realm.


Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications. Daniel N. Robinson. 2003. Princeton University Press. 225pp.

The author attempts in this book to formulate a theory that would justify value judgments.

In our pluralistic age, we note a hesitation to use the words "right" and "wrong", or to call certain acts "good" or "bad", yet we cannot avoid praising certain behavior or blaming people for acts they should not have committed. Reluctant to use clear terms like "right" and "wrong," a teacher might tell a student that his or her behavior is"unhelpful," "unhealthy," or "inappropriate," but beneath such fuzziness the fact that the student was censured remains, and the clearest reason for not engaging in such activity is still moral (the student just mentioned could easily answer "So what? Why do I have to be helpful, or healthy, or comply to your standards of appropriateness?).

Robinson looks at the reasons why modern intellectuals find morality problematic. He points out, for instance, that the fact that sciences are values-free shouldn’t inhibit us from making value judgments where appropriate, since reality is plural in form, and thus techniques of scientific investigation might not apply to moral analysis.

 

The book looks especially at determinism − the view that our actions, psychology and even identity as persons is merely the result of our environment or upbringing, and therefore we do not really choose freely and cannot be considered morally responsible. In a detailed series of reflections, the author makes the claim that we do indeed have sufficient control to be truly considered moral agents.